It has become commonplace in contemporary discussions of Arkan sas politics to make certain intrastate or regional distinctions. For example, based on the evidence of the last decade's statewide and substate elections, Republican candidates are more likely to find favor in northwest Arkansas than in southeast Arkansas. Draw ing on everything from legislative positions on the Equal Rights Amendment and creation science bill to advertisements in the Arkansas Times, it is widely assumed that values and attitudes are more pro gressive in the densely-populated, more urban and sophisticated central region than in the sparsely-populated, more rural and pro vincial hills and lowlands. The considerable Black population in eastern and southern Arkansas presumably skews political opinions and judgments in one direction, while the increasing numbers of midwestern migrants into northern and western Arkansas presumably have a distinctive and dissimilar political impact. Surprisingly, however, very little is actually known about these widely-assumed regional distinctions. Citizen opinions and attitudes can be intuitively extracted from voting behavior in candidate and referendum contests, but the pitfalls in doing so are well known to, and readily admitted by, political scientists^ The kinds of reliable opinion data which might illuminate these intuitive judgments are, unfortunately, far too costly for most political scientists to obtain Our major purpose here is to present some findings on regional variations in Arkansans' attitudes on some contemporary institutions, interests and policy issues. We will begin by briefly reviewing what has been written to date regarding regional variations in Arkansas politics and then describing our data and methods. After presenting our findings we will discuss some possible meanings therein and sug gest some directions for future research.
Thus, to whatever extent regional differences do emerge, this study represents a relatively strong test (albeit within the limits of sampling error) for we largely did not include items that directly address those political behaviors that conventional wisdom points to as especially important for regional differences. The one excep tion is that of partisan self-identification. If regional differ ences had been a primary concern in the design of the questionnaire, certainly we would have included some items regarding political participation and race-related policy issues. Still, our data permit the most thorough analysis of regional differences in the political opinions of Arkansans to date.
A Profile of Political Opinion in Arkansas
As pointed out above. Savage and Gallagher found in their study of Arkansas counties that similarities were more prevalent than dif ferences. As is shown below, regional variations in opinion phenom ena in Arkansas are also less notable than the commonalities in opinion across regions. Accordingly, we begin with a profile of Arkansans (that is, of more articulate and mostly white Arkansans) and then go on to note such regional differences as did emerge in the 1982 survey.
Our first set of questions derived from the quadrennial national surveys conducted by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center. These questions point to six issues of national policy con cern, three of them dealing with economic matters, the other three directed toward issues of contemporary social mores. We asked the respondents to address these questions not only in terms of national action but state action as well.3
The responses to these questions statewide point to a strong conservative stand on economic policy--job security, government health insurance, tax rates (see Tables 1-3 ). These majorities range from about 53% who prefer flatter tax rates to about 60 % opposing govern ment guarantees of job security. Moreover, while individuals may differ on any given issue with regard to national versus state action, in the aggregate, Arkansans do not want different policy stands taken by the two levels of government.
Opinions on the three social issues, legalization of marijuana, 3 In order to save space we present only the regional distributions for positions on national action.
Tabular presentations of such distributions for positions on state action are available from the authors upon request.
Also available from the authors is the original questionnaire although the wording used in the tables presented here is as close to the original as the tabular forms allow.
women's rights, and abortion, showed much greater variations. For example, about two thirds of our respondents lean toward greater penalties for marijuana consumption (see Table 4 ). On the other hand, more than 50% feel positive and less than 25% negative about gender equality (see Table 5 ). The only issue about which there is no clear majority is abortion policy, although the largest plural ity favors a life/health endangerment exception and otherwise banning abortions (see Table 6 ). As with the economic issues, individuals vary with the level of government in their stands, but the aggregate positions on the three social issues statewide are not significantly different across the two levels.
We addressed these six issues in order to be able to make some comparisons with national studies. However, we were also interested in the state's own "policy agenda." To that end we included nine questions dealing with issues receiving recent prominent treatment within the state. Four of these are basically economic issues, pri marily concerning the future development of the state's economy, four others basically address social issues, and one encompasses both economic and social aspects.
While Arkansans take a conservative stance on governmental inter vention in the economy, they nonetheless are anxious for development of the state's economy. In a general question regarding the encourage ment of economic growth, 72.9% favored such encouragement to some extent (see Table 7 ). And with regard to one recent specific issue frequently tied to the growth issue, the constitutional usury limit, a majority (55.6%) favored a change that promoted economic expansion (e.g., the possibility of greater interest rates) either by increas ing, indexing, or eliminating the usury limit (see Table 8 ).4 On the other hand, a slight plurality (44.2%) oppose raising truck weight limits, reflecting a concern for protecting the state's highways (see Table 9 ), while utility corporations have been spectacularly unsuccessful in linking a need for greater profits with such growth as they have frequently argued. More than 70% of our respondents feel that utilities are making excessive profits (see Table 10 ).
No common theme underlies the four social issues addressed here nor is there a clear structuring evident in the responses. More than 60% favor stricter punishments and longer prison sentences and about the same number of respondents want to stop aliens from immigrating to the United States (see Tables 11-12) . With regard to an issue that placed Arkansas directly in the nation's eye, we asked two questions pertinent to the Scientific Creationism law. A strong plurality (47.8%) indicated support for the teaching of scientific creationism in the public schools but only 23.9% indicated any support for legislative tampering with the content of courses in the schools (see Tables 13-14) .
The final issue of the Arkansas policy agenda concerned the quality of public schools in the state. This issue touches upon both economic and social concerns. While we have no evidence either way, note should be taken of the frequent assertions by both politi cal and economic leaders that inferior public education is a signi ficant factor in the state's failure to attract new industry. In any event, 72.1% of our respondents indicated some dissatisfaction with schools in the state and only 16.5% felt that the state's schools are at all satisfactory (see Table 15 ).
More general (and considerably more circumspect) measures of policy orientation are partisan and ideological self-identification. Our findings provide no surprise here; Arkansans conform to the image most often associated with the American South. As shown in Tables 16-17 , they are Democrats (49.9%) but they also tend to see themselves as conservatives (49.5%). At the same time, more than a quarter of these Arkansans identify with the Republican Party. The liberal element is much smaller (17.9%).
While policy orientations provided the major thrust of our survey, we were also concerned about the institutional framework of politics as perceived by Arkansans. One set of such questions asked the respondents to rate the levels of government in the federal system--national, state, and local (see Table 18 ). For the most part, Arkansans conform to national tendencies. They have most faith in local government and least faith in the national government. Pre sumably state government is less salient, for it is the level fewest have the most faith in, and also the level fewest have the least faith in. As to the value of the levels of government, more Arkan sans feel that they get the most for their money from local govern ment and the least from the national government. A majority position by Arkansans occurs with regard to the levels of the federal system, however, only in the matter of taxation. Clearly, the national income tax is not popular in the state as 68.5% of these Arkansans feel that the worst tax is imposed by the national government; surely, most of those are pointing to the income tax.
We also queried Arkansans as to the confidence they place in a number of public and private institutions. Generally, we conclude from Table 19 that more altruistic, less remote, and more decentral ized institutions receive stronger votes of confidence.5
Using a slightly modified list of institutions, we also sought to examine the perceptions, actual and ideal, that Arkansans have of the influence of institutions in the state's politics (see Tables  20-21) . Generally, economic institutions are seen as actually hav ing more power and more altruistic institutions having less. However, the relative rankings for perceived influence are not just the reverse of the confidence ratings; note, for example, that banks rank third in confidence and second in perceived influence. Nor are perceptions of the desired influence of institutions equivalent to the confidence ratings, although corporate organizations, whether business or organ ized labor, are generally desired to have less influence.
In sum, Arkansans tend toward economic boosterism but are cau tious with regard to governmental intervention in the economy. On social issues there is somewhat less agreement. If there is govern mental intervention, Arkansans would seemingly prefer that it come at the local level, but they seem cautious even here since that preference for the local level is couched in terms of a relatively low level of confidence in institutions generally. Finally, it seems likely that Arkansans are alienated from state government, given the low confidence in the Legislature and the Office of the Governor combined with the disparity in the perceived and desired levels of political influence of institutions.
Regional Variations
Almost every item in the questionnaire elicited some significant variation in one or more of the developmental districts. However, each of the sets of questions above tended to exhibit different pat terns of regional response. The greatest degree of variation arises with partisan and ideological affiliation, followed closely by nation al policy issues and levels of the federal system. The least vari ation occurs with the measures of institutional confidence and influence. Moreover, some regions are more varient across the board and others less so. Region 3, Eastern Arkansas, exhibits the least difference from state norms with its greatest deviations appearing with the national policy issues and desired influence of institutions. Region 8, Western Arkansas, varies most from state norms with strong degrees of variance in every category. Generally, along with Eastern Arkansas, Regions 1 (Northwest Arkansas), 4 (Southeast Arkansas), and 5 (Central Arkansas) are less deviant. The more deviant regions other than Western Arkansas are Regions 2 (White River area), 6 (West Cen tral Arkansas), and 7 (Southwest Arkansas).
Eastern Arkansans are generally more conservative with regard to national policy issues. On the state policy issues, they are distinctive only for greater support of economic growth coupled (some what oddly) with noticeably less enthusiasm for increasing truck weight limits. Eastern Arkansans do have more than their share of self-professed "strong" conservatives. They do not differ signifi cantly from state averages on the items relating to levels of the federal system. With regard to state institutions, the respondents in this region differ most markedly in desiring more influence for several institutions--higher education, local government, churches, medicine, banks--but less for organized labor. In general, then, in a conservative state. Eastern Arkansans are somewhat more con servative.
Southeast Arkansans differ from the state norm more often but exhibit much less clarity with regard to any patterning in those differences. Indeed, respondents in this region appear more inclined to take a middle or "neutral" position somewhat more often than those in other regions (note, for example, women's rights in Table 5 and the questions pertinent to scientific creationism in Tables 13-14). The Southeasterners have more than their share of "weak" Democrats and less of "weak" Republicans; there are also fewer "strong" conservatives. The strongest difference in the region's responses concerns perceptions of the levels of the federal system compared to the total sample. They tend to have much greater faith in state government and even less faith in the national govern ment. On only four of the 36 measures relating to institutions in the state do they differ noticeably. In sum, the Southeast Arkan sans, living in the heart of the Delta region, do not conform to images often attributed to white Southerners (and most of these respondents are white) more than Arkansans generally. However, their responses to the levels of the federal system suggest that Dixie still lives on in their hearts.
Central Arkansas, containing the largest metropolitan area in the state, is the most liberal region on the national policy issues, especially the social issues. This is true whether the policy action is national or state in origin with regard to legalization of marijuana, gender equality, or abortion. With regard to other opinion areas, deviations are scattered and reflect no consistent pattern.
The respondents of Northwest Arkansas are somewhat surprising inasmuch as theirs is one of the four regions deviating less from state norms. Proverbial folk wisdom within the region, reaching almost mythic proportions, stresses the "apartness," physically and socially, of this land in the hills. Still, the differences revealed in our findings exhibit some generally consistent patterns. With regard to social issues in contemporary state policy concerns (but not the three national social issues). Northwest Arkansans deviate generally in a more liberal direction--less for stricter penal poli cies, while slightly more likely to welcome refugees. Not surpris ingly, Northwest Arkansas is one of only two regions which is more than 40% Republican. The most striking difference, however, is the reversal of the pattern found in the Southeast with regard to the federal system. Northwesterners are the only ones who exhibit greater faith in the national government than in local government. This might seem a logical consequence of Republicans having greater confidence in a national government led, at present, by Republi cans. However, the fact that the state government also had a Republican leader at the time the survey was taken had no similar "halo" effect: respondents in the region tend to exhibit much less faith in the state government. Relatively little difference is evident with regard to institutions within the state, however. Thus, isolation from the state is somewhat reflected in the responses of Northwest Arkansans, but it may be the perception of isolation itself that most marks the region as distinctive from the rest of the state.
The four remaining regions exhibit much greater deviation from state norms. These regions tend to be the more rural and less popu lated areas of the state. Thus, from a statistical point of view, the overall volume of deviation rather definitely suggests that more than statistical artifact is involved here. The real test is the extent to which patterns of interrelated opinion positions tend to emerge. Let's begin with the White River region of north central Arkansas.
The White River respondents are less supportive of liberal posi tions on several social issues. Relatively fewer of them support a policy of gender equality or abortion on demand. They are more likely to favor stricter punishments and longer sentences and the teaching of scientific creationism in the public schools. Finally, with regard to social issues, they are less inclined to welcome alien refugees. These policy positions suggest if not a traditional sacral position toward social relationships then at least a less secular orientation. The region has a greater share of "strong" Democrats but also of "independent" Republicans as well; not surprisingly then, there are fewer who are altogether independent of partisan leanings. With regard to the federal system, there are notable discontinuities. A greater percentage of White River respondents than of the total sample place the most faith in the state government , but on the other hand, relatively more of them think they get the most for their money from the national government. Ultimately, however, the most striking difference is their lesser inclination to desire insti tutions to have influence on state government. Across twelve institu tions the region's mean weighted score is only 38.0 compared to a state average of 46.9. Indeed, for only two institutions--churches and banks--are the weighted scores not noticeably less than the weighted scores for the state as a whole. Since the White River respondents are not especially distinctive with regard to confi dence in institutions, one interpretation may be that individualism of a rugged sort is involved here. Generally, while the region extends beyond the foothills of the Ozarks, the variant opinion pat terns here suggest something of the less secular orientation to poli tical action that is characteristic of Southern upland politics.
West Central Arkansans tend slightly toward greater liberalism, most notably with regard to a national health insurance policy. These respondents are also notable for a somewhat paradoxical stance on the issues underlying the scientific creationism controversy--on the one hand they are less strong in their support of its teaching and on the other hand, less opposed to legislative intervention in the content of courses in the public schools. "Strong" Democrats are more evident in the region and Republicans generally less so. The region is perhaps most striking, however, with regard to feel ings toward local government and toward organized labor. In the federal context, they are most prone to indicate least faith in local government and less inclined to select it as the level of government from which they get the most for their money. They are also less inclined to desire that local governments have influence on state government. With regard to organized labor. West Central Arkansans tend to have greater confidence and desire it to have greater influence on state government than is the case in other regions. They also tend to perceive organized labor as actually having less influence than is true in most other regions. The West Central region, then, is somewhat unique, but it defies any thumb nail description.
Southwest Arkansans are more conservative on policy issues than any regional group covered to this point. They are even less sup portive of government job guarantees and government health insurance than the state norm but their greater conservatism tends to extend to social issues as well, including marijuana laws, abortion policy, and gender equality. This social conservatism is reflected on cur rent state issues as well: tougher penal policy and support for the teaching of scientific creationism. The region has fewer "strong" Democrats and many more "strong" conservatives. Generally the Southwesterners lean more favorably toward local government and away from the national government. With regard to institutions in the state, they are notable for their lesser confidence in the mass media and their inclination to assign more actual influence to television news in particular. Political conservatism clearly characterizes South west Arkansas.
Finally we arrive at the most distinctive and, as it happens, the most conservative of the state's regions, Western Arkansas. On all those policy issues on which Southwesterners are more conserva tive, except gender equality and scientific creationism, the Western ers also incline to be more conservative than the state norm. To these can be added the tax and refugee policies. Western Arkansans also lean more toward economic boosterism, being even more inclined to encourage growth and, (in perhaps the greatest regional deviation on any survey item) to support raising truck weight limits. At the same time, they they seem less inclined to feel the need for school improvements. It is the only region in the state, other than North west Arkansas, to have more than 40% Republican Party identifiers. There is more aversion to the national government in Western Arkansas than is indicated in the state norm, but that aversion does not reach the levels found in Southeast or Southwest Arkansas. With regard to institutions in the state, Western Arkansans are most notable for their greater inclination to desire influence in state by corporate organizations. This includes not only utilities, oil companies, and other big business, but organized labor as well. Thus, generally. Western Arkansas is the most distinctive region in opinion distribution in the state. That distinctiveness is built upon the strongest degree of both conservatism and economic boosterism to be found anywhere in the state.
Concluding Remarks
The most basic question which this paper addresses is whether there are in fact regional differences in Arkansans' political atti tudes, and clearly our answer to that question must be affirmative. Regional variations in opinions do indeed exist. Our research also suggests, however, that any easy, overly-broad distinctions, such as those sometimes drawn between the "hill" and "swamp" Arkansans, or between the attitudinal worlds of the Ozark and of the Delta, must be regarded with some suspicion. Second, on some contemporary state policy issues, our data indi cate that some of the widest ranges of attitudes occur within areas which have heretofore been generalized together geographically. For example, some of the widest variations in the most intense views on the truck weight issue occur wi thin western Arkansas, that is, between Regions 1 and 8 (see Table 9 ). More than twice as many Region 8 Arkansans as Region 1 Arkansans take the strongest possible posi tion that truck weight limits should be raised, while more than three times as many Region 1 Arkansans as Region 8 Arkansans express the most intense attitude against raising the weight limit. Similarly, the widest range in views on state penal policy emerges between the Region 1 and Region 8 Arkansans, with Region 1 expressing the most lenient views of any group sampled and Region 8 taking the harshest stance. This same wide spread is nearly duplicated on the issues of utility profits and governmental responsibility for job security. With respect to the latter issue, while the two easternmost Arkan sas Regions, 3 and 4, display great similarity on most subjects, twice as many Region 3 Arkansans as Region 4 Arkansans take the most intense position that governments should let each person get ahead on his own.
Explanations for these and other issue-specific variations lie beyond the reach of our data and beyond the purpose of this essay. The existence of such anomalies, however, not only suggests caution in the use of the traditional diagonal division of Arkansas as the beginning of political understanding, but also opens a number of interesting avenues for additional research.
Why, for example, do Region 8 Arkansans, who are in some respects the most economically conservative and presumably therefore the most pro-business group surveyed, express such marked hostility to utility profit-making, especially in contrast to their immediate neighbors to the north in Region 1? Is there a simple contemporary context which explains this disparity (perhaps the Region 8 respondents had just received their electric bills, or perhaps they are serviced by different utilities than are Region 1 respondents), or is there an underlying historical-cultural explanation?
Why are those in Region 7, West Central Arkansas, so much less trusting of local governments than are other Arkansans generally? Is this a residual backlash against once powerful and allegedly unethical local political machines in Garland, Perry, Yell, and Conway counties, or is there a more proximate cause? Do contempo rary situations or past developments offer some explanations as to why labor unions find more favor in this region than elsewhere?
In summary, our findings seem partially to substantiate and partially to challenge conventional wisdom about regional variations in Arkansas politics. Since prior observations were based on every thing from river routes to folklore, and since the "regions" deline ated previously were equally varied in their origins, we did not expect any close comparability between our findings and earlier hypo theses. Indeed, our use of opinion data and our employment of economic development districts precludes any such straightforward comparisons. Nevertheless, in the broad context of Arkansas political studies, we have offered some further confirmation that there are some attitudinal variations from region to region. We also suggest, however, that they tend to be issue-specific, that sometimes the sharpest variations are within geographically-contiguous areas, and that the variations are frequently not easily explicable by conventional wisdom. **So»e to ta ls vary from 100.0% due to rounding e rro r. 99.9 523 *Region 1: Northwest Arkansas EDD; 2: Whit* River PDD; 3: East Arkansas PDD; 4: Southeast Arkansas EDD; 5: Central Arkansas PDD; 6: West Central Arkansas PDD; 7: Southwest Arkansas PDD; 8: Western Arkansas PDD. **Some to ta ls vary fro« 100.0% due to rounding e rro r. ** Some to ta ls vary from 100.07 due to rounding e rro r. **Some to ta ls vary from 100.0% due to rounding e rro r. **Soae to ta ls vary from 100.0% due to rounding e rro r. **Some to ta ls vary fro m 100.0% due to rounding e rro r. ••Includes six respondents whose regional location is unknown. Table 2J REGIONAL ••Includes six respondents whose regional location Is unknown.
